

*Chapter I*

**TYPOLOGY AND MECHANISMS**

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**1. APPROACHES TO CORRUPTION**

When ordinary people talk about corruption they understand each other without difficulty. But the more corruption becomes a subject for research, the more various the approaches become and the more difficult it is to include its interpretations within an overall scientific concept. It turns out that it is the experts, who cannot reach agreement on a phenomenon, when it is clear for the ordinary citizen. In fact, the precise definition of corruption is hardly of importance for the ordinary citizen. The research process, however, needs precise definitions (especially when they substantiate certain political decisions).

**1.1. Definition**

One of the most logical decisions is to make the legal definitions of corruption the basis for its research. That is also one of the most problematic approaches. The variety of corruption practices cannot always fit the labels of criminal law. The emphasis on the narrow criminal definition would leave out the fact that corruption is not an ordinary crime but a negation of the values forming the basis of the political-administrative system. That is why it is hardest for definitions which reduce corruption to a violation of law to be verified by practice. Against this background the advantages of looking from the viewpoint of sociology and political science, within which the legislative treatment of the phenomenon is merely one of the elements, not the leading one at that, stands out.

*1.1.1. Main elements*

At the root of the various definitions of corruption, stand different elements of the process:

- The official (the bribed). Generally, he or she is a representative of public authority, but could be a representative of a private company as well, who to a certain extent also performs “public” functions;
- The client (the briber) – the person who gives the bribe;
- The bribe is the “soul” of the act of corruption. For the wide audience that is money (usually in cash). But the nature of the contemporary bribe is hardly reduced to money and it is not easily established;
- The benefit for the client for the purpose of which the bribe is given. And the more developed the economy is, the less specific the expected benefit is. When the benefit is personal, things are

clear. Possibilities for different interpretation occur when it is not for personal benefit, but for the benefit of parties, institutions, etc. the bribe is taken;

- The non-fulfillment of obligations on the part of the bribed. That is a compulsory requirement for him or her and it can be achieved through actions exceeding or violating his duties, as well as through inaction, in which case it is the natural course of things that “works” for the client;
- The damage of the public interest. A great part of the definitions of corruption centre around that concept, with the inevitable arguments on what is the public interest and on the basis of what criterion it is considered such;
- The secret, or the law of silence, is one of the strong consolidating elements in structures formed on the basis of corruption;

To these elements some authors add the presence of a corruptive plan or intention, especially for the needs of criminal definition of corruption. But that would make legal prosecution of corruption almost impossible. Occurrence of corruptive intention in itself is a social problem, notwithstanding to what extent it is fulfilled.

### *1.1.2. Social context*

The interaction between all the elements of corruptive chain characterises a specific *relationship between public and private*. That is why defining corruption through these two polar categories has considerable grounds. Here it is necessary to specify that partial overlapping of public and private interest does not mean there is synchronicity between them. Because it is when the pursuit of personal interest results in public well being that, to a great extent, the problem of corruption disappears. Presenting corruption as a kind of exchange is the inspiration for one of the strongest trends in the study of corruption, to which we owe the so-called market-oriented definitions.

The attitude to corruption of people who study it cannot be but influenced by the general level of tolerance to it. This level varies greatly depending on whether it refers to a developing country (which only now discovers the way to democracy), an East-European country (which rediscovers the way to democracy) or to some of the developed countries (among which there are also considerable differences).

## **2. TYPES AND MECHANISMS OF CORRUPTION**

### **2.1. Everyday ideas of corruption**

Like the way democracy undergoes a continuous tendency of being reduced to a few easily established characteristics, corruption too, according to the general opinion, is reduced to the bribe – “the envelope with money” – given “under the table”. Indeed, the *bribe* is the key element of the corruption chain. But reducing corruption to what is legally prosecuted isolates condemnable behaviour from the whole sum of circumstances which make it possible. Practically, the development of corruption today has long overcome this reductionism: the character of contemporary economic relations and their scale result in unbelievable perfection in concealing bribes. With the expansion of corruption, as an element the bribe gradually becomes more vague,

and the favours of the representative of public authority and the payment for it are extended in time and sometimes create favourable conditions in general or a profit of non-material character – information, image, etc., e.g. contemporary corruption is dematerialised. In developed countries, for example, the boundary of a corrupt act becomes more flexible and the financial benefit is just a final (and not entirely compulsory at that) stage and the participation of different agents in it is extremely difficult to be established.

Generally, there is one thing in common: the closer the political exchange is to the social one (the more complicated and differentiated the ways of exchanging goods are), the more difficult it is to qualify it in terms of corruption.

## **2.2. Typology of corruption**

Criteria, on the basis of which the types of corruption are distinguished, are practically invariable.

### *2.2.1 Types according to scale*

According to its scale, conditionally corruption could be differentiated into three types:

- Small – when the official does the favour on friendly basis;
- Routine – bribing in the name of general welfare, acts of nepotism in appointing or concluding contracts, deriving benefit from the decisions of public bodies through side activities, “put-up” of votes in elections, etc.;
- Acute – ensuring a “fair” trial, “expanding” the trial, tolerating organised crime, change of party commitment due to bribes, ignoring clear evidence of corruption on the part of officials and citizens.

Obviously with routine corruption the official shows partiality in performing his duties but he performs them anyway, while with final forms of corruption he creates special organisation in order to serve certain private interests.

### *2.2.2. Types according to public perception*

According to the general public and the elite, three other types of corruption can be distinguished:

- White – when in public opinion and among representatives of the elite there is tolerance of corruption. This is the case when taking measures against corruption, aiming at defending the values dominant in society, would cost more than the damage caused by corruption;
- Gray – when the greater part of the elite is in favour of attacking corruption through the criminal code and the majority is in two minds;
- Black – when both public opinion and elite are “in favour” of severe punishment of corruptive behaviour.

### *2.2.3. Other criteria*

Depending on who is the beneficiary, corruption is divided into personal (“bad”) and collective (“good”). Depending on the environment in which corruption manifests itself we could speak about local and national corruption, in spite of the natural fusion between the two. Finally, we could differentiate between bureaucratic (conventional) and political (intermediary) corruption. Unlike conventional corruption, political corruption is characterised by two special features. The benefit for the politician is of political character and cannot be reduced directly to money. The result is the evasion of the elements of democratic process: representativeness, accountability, openness of debates, equality before the law, etc.

### **2.3. Mechanisms of corruption**

As early as the 1930s attempts have been made to generalise the main techniques used in corruption: bribes, blackmail (by public officials), control over public property, political discrimination in formulating and administering an act, political discrimination in serving the population, autocracy when one and the same person plays both parts of official and client, etc.

Nowadays the “achievements” of corruption can be found mainly along the lines of its increased mimicry. The money from corruption flows in increasingly roundabout ways and is used in increasingly subtle techniques of “recycling”. The invisibility of corruption deals is provided by a long lines of techniques: doing the operations entirely by mediators – brokers and agencies; using fictional companies; regrouping, keeping secret the final participant; using secret methods of payment; simultaneously doing a number of parallel services in order to conceal the corrupt one; using false invoices; maneuvering between local and national level; lack of transparency in solving important public issues; depriving of content rudimentary forms of publicity, covering up the tracks by moves on a national level, including passing through some of the “fiscal paradise” countries; concentration of power; a play of secret agreements, words unspoken, implicit codes, etc. Each of these techniques makes the acts seemingly compliant with the law and hiding visible payments.

As far as social resources allow it, all this forms a vicious circle: strengthening of corruption increases the public tolerance; increasing of corruption “at the top” strengthens the tendency towards corruption “at the bottom”, etc.

## **3. REASONS FOR CORRUPTION**

### **3.1. General reasons**

Notwithstanding that corruption is carried out with the participation of a representative of the state authority, as far as it violates the generally accepted legal and ethical norms, it is accomplished outside the public space as a relationship between two private persons.

#### *3.1.1. Personal character of the relations*

Where certain *forms of personal relations* (clientism, patrimonialism, nepotism, etc.) exist, corruption can find a favourable ground for development. In Bulgaria (and other East European countries), a great variety of such networks of personal relations are the inheritance of the structures of totalitarian society. Such relations connect many of the members of the former communist

nomenclature, officials of the former state security departments, party and comsomol committees, etc.

The personal character of corrupt deals determines the great importance of trust in them. Its role is twofold: the low level of trust between citizens (the way it is in Italy) has as a side effect a deeply rooted tradition of corruption but at the same time the greater trust between clients and patrons, who know each other well, favours an increase in the number of crooked deals because it decrease the risk. In the first case corruption guarantees the respective act, while in the second case the trust between the two sides guarantees the stability of the corrupt deal.

### *3.1.2. The private-public relation*

As it has already been mentioned, notwithstanding the way of interpretation, a structure-determining prerequisite for the origin of a corrupt type of personal relations is a certain type of partial overlapping, “*an osmosis of private and public interest*”.

Under such circumstances the politician to a great extent considers himself an entrepreneur, who owing to his public position, ousts the traditional public agent. Partially due to the natural change of generations in many countries, the old type of politician is replaced by business-politicians. They lack the professional training and ideological background of the old one necessary for being in tune with the typical mass interests. But they are responsible to administrative-political suggestions which have a profit potential, they are convincing in realising this potential and they succeed in making the organisation necessary for the purpose with the participation of politicians, administrators and private persons. The profile of a new type of politician is emerging: ambitious, yearning for quick progress, arrogant.

Although the one side of the relations from which corruption originates consists of representatives of the private sector, it is the participation of representatives of the public authority that imposes on these relations the principles of the public sphere. If the private entrepreneur can find its interest within the public one, there is contact. But the organising part belongs to the principles of the public sphere. Corruption is one of the main forms in which public interest takes a private form. Therefore the level of corruption of a society directly depends on the *level of public awareness* of the work of its political and administrative bodies and by the general level of public awareness in society. The domination of a political motivation, hidden from the audience, the non-public character of the policy carried out finds in corruption a more visible continuation. In that respect corruption is a substantiation and an expression of the non-public policy of a given society.

### *3.1.3. State interference in the economy*

The most fundamental aspect of the interaction between public and private, which affects the corruptiveness of a society, is the *level of state interference with the private sector*. Corruption is born in the “dynamic drama”, which is taking place between “organised money and organised people”. At the same time there are two important approaches which are contradictory.

According to representatives of the neo-liberal school the excessive interference of state with the economy results in a black market and corruption. Corruption is viewed as a corrective of the compulsory power of authority, oil greasing the wheels of the economy. It is assumed that excessive state interference creates many barriers which the representative of the private sector has to circumvent if he wants to save means, time and strength in issuing all kinds of permits (for construction, export, import, production, etc.), licences, etc. The response to such arguments is that it is attacks against state interference that lead to devaluation of the state at the expense of the final stabilisation of the market. Imposing its categories (profit, efficiency, competitiveness, etc.) in the state sector all the more destroys the boundary between public and private, reduces the ethical price of corruption and thus expands its range. This argument in fact is to a great extent speculative: both excessive and limited interference might have one and the same effect; one and the same arguments can be used both for to both condemn and praise it. The main issue is not “where” (in the strong or the weak end of the state interference scale) the private and public sectors will meet, but “how “ it will happen – whether the parts of the public official and private person will merge.

A special “contribution” of the state to the expansion of corruption is the lack of flexibility in its activities. This might be due to the fact that overly general or outdated acts are into force or that it is the letter of the law that is obeyed and not the spirit, etc. In such cases violation or circumvention of law becomes a “functional necessity”.

### *3.1.4. Financing the political parties*

The “Americanisation” of election campaigns since the 1970s has abruptly increased the need for parties to find funding. Approximately at that time the character of the parties also changed: the number of their members abruptly decreased and they gradually turned into parties of sympathisers. These facts sharply intensified the problem of *financing the parties*. The great need for financial means opens a gap for powerful invasion of private interests in politics. Each of the developed countries tries to control the process with the help of different restrictive measures but it seems none of the measures represents an insurmountable barrier.

Although in a considerably modified shape, these factors are found in full effect in Bulgaria too. Sporadic journalistic investigations or episodic exchanges of fire between political opponents does not change the fact that the existence of this problem has not yet received the necessary official, not to mention legislative, acknowledgment. Seemingly the problem does not exist or at least it is not considered very important. At the same time the expenses of the main political parties are in a glaring contradiction to the officially established income. In Bulgaria that continues to be treated as an act of civil responsibility of private capital to the political democracy of the country.

### *3.1.5. Freedom of action*

The factors operating on a public level result in a factor on an individual level – the *freedom of action* of the official. Corruption is lower when the factor is “a subject of totally bound roles”. This freedom can find expression in many forms, such as the right to close deals, decide which contract is the most “profitable” for the institution, which client is to be given favourable credits, which company is to be assigned to construct a big project, change city plans, etc. Finally, it could simply mean the freedom to take a passive attitude – not solving a certain problem or solving it in such a way that a certain side could profit. A new area is the freedom involved in control of information

that is important for the private sector. All such cases obviously involve the greater or lesser independence of the public official from the public and to the loss of the public character of his work. Very often the potential for such activities is inherent in the accumulation of mandates in one and same person.

### *3.1.6. The price of corruption*

Naturally freedom of action is just a formal condition for entering the corruption process. The representative of the public authority takes the risk mainly because of some benefit. Let us call this benefit a “bribe” in order to make the terms of analysis easier. All circumstances influencing the amount of the bribe are factors which affect the price of corruption and thus its pervasiveness. Like any other price, it depends on supply and demand. But since supply and demand are a generalisation of all the other factors, in order to avoid repetition only factors which result from merely economic mechanisms will be mentioned:

- A greater number of private sector representatives needing the same favour lead to an increase in its price. At the same time greater demand can limit the possibilities for maneuvering of the official by enforcing public control and thus increasing the price to levels at which the corrupt deal becomes impossible.;
- The level of uniqueness of the favour offered is in direct proportion to its price. But when its execution takes the participation of many officials from different levels, it will be considerably more expensive;
- An intentional increase in the value of the offered good leads to an increase in the price of the bribe. For example, if we speak about privatisation of a state-owned enterprise, authorities could limit competition in the same sector, thus more or less guaranteeing the future owner monopoly rights;
- Initial expenses may be raise the price of the bribe. For instance, there are expenses involved in taking a certain position, for example if a bribe is paid to become a customs officer; expenses on organising the deal, etc.;
- The amount of risk, which reflects the social environment and the institutions organising it, the effectiveness of legal norms, the severity of punishment, the force of control, etc.
- The “consumer attitude” , depending on its scale, leads to a greater or lesser appetite for the corrupt deal;
- Unemployment has a twofold influence, increasing the need for the corrupt deal (for example a subsistence payment) but also means there are less resources to be handed out.

### *3.1.7. The third party*

The relations between public and private sector are also entered by a third party – representatives of the shadow economy, organised crime, generally all kinds of *organised secret interests*. Bulgaria

(like other East European countries) received an evil inheritance from its totalitarian past in the form of a colourful palette of preliminarily organised or reorganised interests.

The creation of networks of personally-bound representatives of public and private sector on a “subconscious reaction” level is a bulwark against the uncertainty resulting from the radical restructuring and disintegrating of society. On a rational level, however, it is the most effective way for maximising privatisation appetites – first, when selecting the optimum circle of representatives of different sectors and institutions for fulfilling their purposes; second, when the related work of the conspirators is checked. That is why the higher a person goes up the political and administrative ladder, the more probable it is for his “friendly circle” to go up with him. Under such circumstance intra-party struggle often prevails over inter-party fights, public displays notwithstanding. Political life becomes contaminated by a particularisation of the Mafia type.

One way or the another, secret interests give rise to secret relations which cannot be regulated by public bodies. They can be influenced only by exposing the secrets and counteracting the absence of publicity.

### **3.2. Specifics of the Bulgarian situation**

#### *3.2.1. Erosion of the public-private relation*

Totalitarian society of a socialist type is characterised by an utter domination of public over private in production, trade, communication, and ideas. Outside official structures there is no place for significant private interests and within these structures they are ideologically suffocated. How this circumstance affects corruption within socialism is another matter. We are interested in how the grip of the public over private is loosened in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

First, the barriers for private initiatives of all types fall. This is a task, which can literally be solved with one legislative act from the central power. Its real complexity is connected with the other half of the question: how private interest fills the emptied social room, especially involving the former socialist property. While all kinds of answers were suggested and rejected, the private interest invaded the former socialist public property, which turned out to be a fertile soil for corruption of all kinds.

Under these circumstances the general factors which cause the irresistible erosion in the relations between public authority and private persons could be generalised as follows:

- The big stake in this process is the privatisation of the national wealth;
- An abrupt increase in the significance of representatives of public authority – politicians and administrators;
- The people who at the beginning of the transition are in charge of state industrial enterprises become key figures in privatisation;



- Unlimited uses of means of corruption due to the near-inexhaustibility of their source – the resources of society itself, used with the help of the banking system, financial pyramids, rackets, etc.;
- The incompatibility of the ideologies of totalitarian and market societies, which makes it difficult for the public and therefore for the political control over the process by creating a wonderful opportunity for political manipulations between public and non-public;
- The great disparity between the means of the authorities and of those who participate in the privatisation of the national wealth;
- Social disintegration resulting from the change of the political and economic system, which is compensated through corruption;
- Until now the lack of clear-cut boundaries between the public and private sector was pointed out as the fundamental reason for corruption. In order to be precise we should say that the real reason is the existence of insufficient barriers. The lack of restrictions, of any apprehension or consideration, connected with public interest would make corruption deals impossible – everyone would take whatever he likes. In this sense corruption could occur where there is a certain level of state organisation.

### *3.2.2. Auto-corruption*

The development of the situation in Bulgaria was similar in the last ten years due to the character and depth of the change. The transition from predominantly state-owned to private property, from one type of political system to its opposite inevitably goes through a phase of abeyance and anarchy, a vagueness of principles. The greater part of public property and wealth were not appropriated simply because there was *no one to be bribed*: all key figures were accessories in a network of non-public party-economic relations on the basis of mutual support. It is hardly a coincidence that such relations are reminiscent of the relations between the representatives of the old communist nomenclature, where mutual favours were the way of its existence and reproduction as a privileged group. All accessories holding public positions or having at their disposal public means had a common goal, to which the institutions and organisations they represented were subordinate. In the period of the “big robbery” corruption played the role of an additional means, applied more frequently to representatives of the lower levels of public authority and control bodies. That is why the quick ending of this robbing sharpened the need for applying more subtle mechanisms such as corruption and strengthened its eroding effect on society.

Viewed from up close the mechanism of this appropriation through complicity is in fact the dominance of one form that could be called auto-corruption. This is the case when one and the same person is both the briber and the bribed. Instead of doing favours for a certain fee, the official refuses or more correctly saves it in order to get a personal benefit from the possibilities of public power. This way he receives the benefits of the briber and the bribed. Compared to auto-corruption, classical corruption is far more harmless because the benefit from the bribe and the favour (even though forced) is divided between two people for the purpose of greater seemliness.

### *3.2.3. The role of big business*

The fact that the so-called big business did not emerge as a result of a natural process of accumulation led to two things:

- A sharp contrast between the wealth of big business and the income of public representatives, who became easy prey for the temptations;
- Discrepancy between the amount of means and the scale of thinking of their owners. Those were means which corrupted not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of the quality of their application.

#### *3.2.4. Organised crime*

Limiting the already legal or semi-legal business of organised crime on its part could also lead to expansion of corruption, as criminals seeking new sources of income increase the pressure on public officials. Therefore the progress in fighting corruption is not always parallel to the limitation of its range. The explanation, as it was already clarified, is due to the existence of such pathological forms in the relations between public and private, which although not necessarily associated with the idea of corruption, are its more dangerous predecessors.

### **3.3. Main dependencies**

There is a definite correspondence between the public and the private sector, and the following correlations can be formulated:

- In authoritarian regimes, compared to the democratic ones, bribes are greater in number but smaller in amount;
- Corruption varies in inverse proportion to the level of agreement within authority. Governments that squabble more in decision-making have greater difficulties with corruption;
- A country liberalising the economy without liberalising the state (issuing acts, regulating conflicts of interests, the financial enrichment of citizens, acts sanctioning corruption, etc.) is at the risk of creating conditions for great temptations for public officials to take advantage of the private wealth being offered;
- If corruption income allowed by state control is high, political coalitions will invest excessively in the struggle for power and after obtaining it will increase the public, economic and other types of interference for the purpose of “maximising corruption income”.

Therefore the occurrence of scandals connected with corruption might be treated as an occasional challenge for legitimising the public power, as an invitation to reconfirm the duties of the political and administrative elite.

## **4. CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION**

The view on the consequences of corruption depends to a certain extent on the theoretical bias of the person who studies it. There is an opinion that corruption increases the efficiency of the political-

administrative system and represents only a redistribution of rents at the expense of the owners of monopoly positions. Such cases, however, refer to all too limited examples, mainly from the experience of developing countries in the process of creating their own administrative power. Such opinions obviously omit the main claimant – society itself – in the person of public interest.

Corruption attacks all political systems in so far as each of them in a different way binds the public and the private sectors. Some of the more important tendencies are:

- By weakening the democratically-established political and administrative structures *corruption deprives democratic procedures of meaning*, by distancing people from participation in the management. Personal relations created on the basis of corruption result in the loss of the sense of communal belonging and instead are dependent on a powerful person (the patron);
- The interdependence between corrupt officials themselves is at the basis of their solidarity and observation of the code of silence and *establishes the negative tendencies* of lack of guarantees and regulations, dominance of the corrupt, loss of the sense of common good, lack of trust in the state and its public power, etc.;
- Public activities begin to be viewed as a task only of the respective officials the result of which is that the cooperation of citizens in the struggle with corruption can be relied on very little. The state of total apathy means joining the silent conspiracy on which corruption is based.

The utter chaos in the ways of financing political parties in Bulgaria has no less disastrous effects. It not only threatens to turn political forces into hostages of private interests (the main consideration for putting restrictions on financing political parties on the part of developed countries). The more terrible thing is that the total lack of regulations creates prerequisites for the party leaders themselves to turn into big businessmen, to view their party (political) career as a kind of business. Then the immediate threat comes not from the private person, who “buys” politics, but from the politician who becomes a private person. This threat is all the more real taking into consideration the merger of economic and political power in totalitarianism, the remnants of which are still alive today.

Naturally, corruption cannot strike the public without affecting the private. It is the mediator who allows the businessman to view the possibilities of public authority as his own. Corruption encourages the non-productive behaviour of private counteragents. Similarly, money from corruption (especially in large amounts) is utilised outside the field of public interest - to illegal business or simply to overconsumption. The negative moral effect of participation in corruption is complemented by the negative moral effect from disposing of the income from it.

## **5. RESTRICTING CORRUPTION**

Some authors, most frequently representatives of the economic approach to corruption, accept the existence of an optimum level of corruption for society, beyond which additional expenses for its removal would only cause more damage to the public interest. Naturally, in theory it is possible for an admissible level of corruption to exist. But does the author include in his calculations the increasing tendency of corruption towards expansion? And in that case which would be the “optimum” level?

There are several **structural problems** in the struggle against corruption:

- Its mimicry of and fusion with the usual forms of economic and social exchange, especially when the exchange encompasses the whole of society;
- The apathy of the public opinion, itself being a result of the corruption in the public sphere;
- The unfavourable circumstances where representatives of the public sphere should lead the struggle against corruption, while they are the real source of the problem;
- The post-totalitarian inheritance of overlapping political and economic power.

The brunt of the measures restricting corruption should be directed towards the factors which sustain it. In this respect they cannot but repeat the reasons for its existence. All of them, although viewed from different perspectives, should attack the pathology in the public-private relations. In order to solve the task, it is necessary to break it down into several simpler tasks:

- Breaking the personal connections which representatives of the public sphere establish with those of the private sphere. This is achieved through the general distribution of power, the separation of executive functions from the functions on control, selection and assessment of personnel, etc. It is also necessary to “harden” the incompatibility of certain public duties with commitments with the private sector, including using the system which in France is called “pantouflage” – a 5-year restriction between leaving a state job and joining a private firm involved in the same sector;
- Improving the state’s regulation of economy. To liberal economists that means restricting the state interference with the economy, but this does not guarantee success. Another possible solution is decentralisation of power, which however could have a twofold effect: positive (restricting corruption at the higher levels of power) and negative (expanding corruption on the local level). This section includes also the suggestion of the national crime fighting strategy for “optimising the administrative structures”. However, reducing the struggle against corruption to the mere measure of changing the permit regime (as a synonym for corruption) with a registration regime (as a synonym for “incorruptible” administration) shows a not so complicated view of the problem. It is not an issue of regimes (since they can easily overlap) but of the kind of administrative service as a complex social category;
- Limiting the freedom of action of officials. Here we could list limiting the monopoly power of the official over the client, respectively removing the written and unwritten bureaucratic privileges, limiting the “gaps” in the employer-employee relationship, creating clear rules and standards for administrative service (a national strategy), etc.;
- Increasing publicity in the administrative sphere on two levels: information (connected with the transparency in the work of administrative bodies) and organisation (directly connected with the creation of clear rules and standards for administrative service). On a political level the increase of publicity is connected mainly with the functions of the opposition. And in a broader sense it depends on the work of non-government organisations, which might serve as a corrective, although they, too, are not immune to corruption. Parallel to the measures in support of the institutions of civil society

should be the measures against organised secret interests. In the long run solving this task depends on the public spirit of politics and society in general, on whether it has become a tradition;

- Regulating the financing of political parties. In light of Bulgarian conditions it is not so important to set maximum amounts for donations from the private sector but to introduce rules;
- Taking measures to increase the “moral price” of corruption. They aim at turning the corruption deal from a sensible measure into an unjustified risk. In that respect the system of administrative system stimuli and sanctions, combined with the increase of the level of education of people working in the public sphere, is the most effective;
- Improving legislation in view of eliminating the outdated and inapplicable texts, improving the flexibility of administrative service and in particular of law enforcement;
- Creating a system for gathering and analysing information concerning the various aspects of corruption;
- Taking measures directed towards abolishing acts of corruption. For this purpose it is necessary to achieve more than what is long discussed in society – coordinating the efforts of all bodies. If one of the units does not function efficiently, it has a negative demoralising effect on the others too. This opens a wide field for the media.
- Registering the property of state officials, which should be done on at least two occasions: upon taking office and when there is suspicion of discrepancy between the income and expenses of the official. However expedient this measure might be, it could hardly deal with the practice of transferring property to relatives, friends or figureheads, not to mention transfer of money to foreign banks.